PUBLIC CONTRACT PROJECT : CASE BANK OF ENGLAND (BoE)
CALL TO ACTION
Are you a forward-thinking business, an innovator in the financial technology sector, or a company committed to sustainable and ethical practices? Are you frustrated by the barriers to entry, the unlevel playing field, and the lack of fair competition in the UK financial markets, which are dominated by a few incumbent players? We believe that a collective of agile, responsible, and innovative companies can challenge this status quo. Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO) is launching a strategic initiative to create a powerful consortium to deliver superior solutions to the public sector. We are preparing unsolicited proposals and positioning our alliance to compete for government and public body tenders in areas ranging from efficient payment systems and digital banking solutions (NACE codes 62, 63) to sustainable finance and risk management consultancy (NACE code 70229). Our goal is to unite competitors and business users who have been disadvantaged by the current market structure into a collaborative force that can offer better value, greater transparency, and more innovative services than the established players. By joining our Contract Project, you will gain a powerful collective voice, create new commercial opportunities within public sector procurement, and play a pivotal role in building a more dynamic and equitable financial ecosystem. If you are interested in exploring this collaborative opportunity, we invite you to contact us for a confidential discussion on how we can work together to achieve these goals
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UK TENDERS
From the document on the UK Constitution, I have extracted the foundational principles of our system of government. It explicitly confirms that the executive is accountable to Parliament and that the judiciary’s role is to uphold the rule of law and the rights of individuals. This is invaluable for our case because it provides the overarching framework for holding public bodies to account. When we challenge a decision by the Bank of England or the FCA as irrational or procedurally improper, we are not just arguing a technical point; we are arguing that they have failed to adhere to the core tenets of British governance. For the media campaign, this allows us to frame our fight as one for democratic accountability and the rule of law, which resonates strongly with the public. In a mediation setting, it elevates our position beyond that of a mere complainant to a defender of constitutional principles, adding significant weight to our arguments.
The Public Sector Classification Guide from the Office for National Statistics is a critical operational tool. It gives us an official, indisputable list of which entities are considered part of the public sector. For instance, it definitively classifies the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority as public financial corporations, and confirms that bodies like Network Rail are now part of central government. This is legally essential because it establishes the jurisdictional basis for a judicial review against these bodies. We no longer need to argue that they should be treated as public bodies; we can state that they are, according to the government’s own classifications. For the media campaign, this allows us to clearly and accurately map out the landscape of public and quasi-public entities, exposing the complex web of control and influence that we argue requires greater transparency. In mediation, it removes any ambiguity and allows us to focus immediately on the substance of their actions, as their public status is a settled matter.
The report on Hybrid Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) is a goldmine of information that strengthens our claims of negligence and the mis-pricing of risk. It details the complex financial structures, risk allocation models, and incentive problems inherent in large-scale projects, which are precisely the kinds of ventures our target banks are financing. By studying the case studies, like the Athens Ring Road, we can understand the typical points of failure, such as inadequate risk assessment, cost overruns, and the public sector being left with unforeseen liabilities. This allows us to build a more sophisticated legal argument that the banks, as expert financial institutions, were negligent in not identifying and mitigating these very same risks when funding similar projects. For the media campaign, we can use the concepts of “financing gaps” and risk transfer to explain to the public how complex financial engineering can lead to private profits at public expense. For mediation, we can use the best-practice principles outlined in the report as a benchmark, asking the banks to demonstrate how their due diligence on, for example, a high-risk fossil fuel project, met these established international standards.
The Value for Money (VfM) spreadsheet and the Knowledge Assets Register template provide us with the internal logic and language of public sector decision-making. The VfM model is essentially the blueprint for how a government body justifies choosing a private sector partner. This allows us to reverse-engineer their decisions. For our disclosure requests, we can now demand not just the final VfM report, but the specific inputs and assumptions used in their calculations, such as the chosen discount rate (STPR), risk valuations, and optimism bias. This moves our challenge from a general claim of irrationality to a forensic cross-examination of their quantitative reasoning, which is a much stronger position for a legal case. The knowledge assets template highlights the modern reality that a company’s most valuable assets are often intangible, like data and intellectual property. This directly supports our competition law claims, where we argue that incumbent banks are hoarding valuable data and technology, thereby preventing FinTech innovators from competing effectively. We can now argue that this “knowledge asset” is a key input that is being unfairly withheld, which is a powerful narrative for both the media and for potential legal action.
In essence, these documents provide the constitutional authority, the official classifications, the financial mechanics, and the analytical tools to transform our case from a series of strong allegations into a tightly-argued, evidence-based challenge. We can now precisely identify the duties of public bodies, the specific products and markets where harm is occurring, and the very methodologies used to justify the decisions we seek to overturn. This strengthens every aspect of our strategy, from public persuasion to legal confrontation.
The goal is to align our identified causes of action and proposed solutions with current and forthcoming UK and EU public sector tenders. This approach allows us to frame our unsolicited proposals more effectively and, where appropriate, participate directly in procurement processes, thereby influencing policy and creating change from within the system.
A significant opportunity lies within the area of Financial Services Consultancy and Advisory Services. The Crown Commercial Service (CCS) frequently issues framework agreements for these services, which are used by a wide range of public bodies, from central government departments like HM Treasury to regulators such as the FCA and PRA. A key framework to monitor is the Management Consultancy Framework (currently MCF3), which often includes lots for financial and risk advisory. We could position COCOO as a specialist provider, offering unique expertise in identifying systemic risks that are often missed by traditional analysis, drawing directly from our work on the failings at SVB and Credit Suisse. The common harm we address—the public cost of bank failures—is a direct concern for HM Treasury, the ultimate guarantor of the system. Tenders under this framework typically have a lifecycle of several years, but opportunities to join can arise during refresh periods or new iterations. We should monitor the CCS upcoming deals pipeline for “MCF4,” which would likely be advertised on Contracts Finder and Find a Tender with a response window of approximately 40-60 days from publication.
Another highly relevant area is Competition and Economic Analysis. The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), as well as sector-specific regulators like Ofcom and Ofgem, regularly procure external economic analysis to support market studies and investigations. For instance, a tender might be issued for a “Study on the Impact of Vertical Integration in Payment Systems” or “Analysis of Barriers to Entry in SME Banking.” These directly align with our causes ofaction concerning the potential for anti-competitive behaviour by incumbent banks (operating under NACE code 64.19) against FinTech challengers (operating under NACE codes 62.01, 62.09, and 63.11). Our analysis of the EU’s vertical restraints block exemption and the market definitions in cases like APX-ENDEX/ICE gives us a significant edge. Such tenders are often advertised on Contracts Finder and can have relatively short deadlines, sometimes as little as 30 days from publication. We can prepare a strong unsolicited proposal to the CMA, showcasing our unique analytical framework, which could position us favourably for when such a tender is released or even prompt them to consider commissioning such work.
A rapidly emerging field is Climate and Environmental Risk Advisory Services. Government departments, particularly the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Defra, and financial regulators like the Bank of England, are increasingly seeking expert advice on integrating climate-related financial risks into their frameworks. We have seen tenders for services related to climate scenario analysis and assessing the impact of negative externalities. This aligns perfectly with our cause of action related to banks’ financing of high-carbon sectors, such as oil and gas extraction (NACE Division 06) and coal mining (NACE Division 05). Our detailed analysis of the harm caused to sectors like agriculture (NACE Section A) and insurance (NACE Section K) provides a unique, evidence-based perspective. We should monitor for tenders from the Bank of England for “consultancy on climate-related financial disclosures” or from Defra for “economic analysis of environmental liability frameworks.” These opportunities are often published on the government’s e-tendering portals with deadlines typically ranging from 4 to 6 weeks.
Finally, there are opportunities related to Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and project finance advisory. The UK government continues to use PPP models for major infrastructure projects, as detailed in the provided documents on hybrid PPPs. A key area for us is providing advisory services on the “Value for Money” (VfM) and public interest aspects of these projects. We can leverage our analysis to critique projects that may involve state-owned or state-supported foreign companies, raising concerns about unfair competition or the importation of poor governance standards. Tenders for “Independent VfM Assessors” or “Project Finance Due Diligence Advisors” are regularly issued by bodies like the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) or specific government departments. These are typically procured through frameworks like the previously mentioned Management Consultancy Framework. The deadline for responding to these framework tenders is fixed, but once on a framework, “call-off” competitions have very short turnarounds, often 2-3 weeks. Our unique selling proposition would be our ability to assess not just the financial aspects but also the embedded competition and systemic risks, ensuring that public funds are not used to subsidise anti-competitive or reckless private sector behaviour.
To act on these opportunities, we must register on both the UK’s Contracts Finder and Find a Tender service, setting up alerts for keywords such as “financial regulation,” “competition economics,” “systemic risk,” “sustainable finance,” and “public-private partnership.” For EU-level opportunities, which are still relevant for understanding policy direction and identifying international partners, we will monitor the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) portal. Given the typical 30-60 day response window for most relevant tenders, we will need to have our core value proposition and evidence base from our case files prepared in advance, allowing us to rapidly tailor our response to specific procurement requirements. This proactive approach will maximise our chances of successfully engaging with and influencing the public sector.
EU TENDERS
Of course. Based on our comprehensive review of the case materials, it is clear that several potential causes of action exist not only against private banks but also directly implicating UK public sector bodies. These governmental and regulatory failures create avenues for legal challenges and, in many instances, establish a basis for asserting that private companies are jointly responsible for the resulting harm.
One of the most significant potential causes of action is in the tort of negligence against the financial regulators, specifically the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank of England. The core of this claim would be that these bodies have breached their statutory duty to ensure the stability of the financial system by failing to adequately supervise the banks they oversee. The provided materials on the collapses of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse demonstrate that regulatory capital frameworks, such as the CET1 ratio, were insufficient to prevent failure caused by unmanaged interest rate risk and profound internal control weaknesses. We can allege that the regulators have been negligent in permitting UK banks to operate with similar, foreseeable vulnerabilities. This regulatory failure creates the conditions for the major UK banks, including HSBC, Barclays, and NatWest, all operating within the NACE code for Other monetary intermediation (64.19), to act with a degree of recklessness. These banks are therefore jointly responsible for the resulting risk, as their own internal risk management failures are enabled by the regulator’s lack of effective scrutiny. The harm caused by this joint failure impacts a wide class of victims, from shareholders who suffer financial loss to businesses in sectors like construction (NACE Division 41-43) and retail (NACE Division 47) that are damaged by the resulting economic instability. While suing a regulator in tort is legally difficult, a judicial review of their supervisory decisions has a moderate chance of success, and a media campaign highlighting this regulatory dereliction of duty has a very high probability of success in generating public and political pressure.
Furthermore, a distinct cause of action exists against HM Treasury and the PRA regarding the decision to delay the implementation of the Basel 3.1 international banking standards. This action can be framed as a judicial review claim, arguing that the decision was irrational, giving undue weight to arguments of “competitiveness” over the primary statutory objective of ensuring financial stability. The private companies jointly implicated here are the large incumbent banks who benefit directly from this regulatory forbearance, which allows them to operate with lower capital reserves for longer. These banks, which fall under the ICB supersector for Banks (3010), likely lobbied for this outcome. The victims are their smaller competitors, including challenger banks and innovative FinTech firms (classified under NACE 62, Computer programming and consultancy), who are disadvantaged by the unlevel playing field. Small and medium-sized enterprises across all industries are also potential claimants, as the parliamentary records suggest this delay could restrict their access to vital credit. A legal claim from a coalition of these affected businesses would have a medium to high chance of success in mediation or forcing a policy review, and the narrative of big banks getting favourable treatment at the expense of small businesses is exceptionally powerful for a media campaign.
Another significant area involves the financing of activities with severe negative externalities, implicating both the banks and, by extension, the government for its failure to regulate. The case files on oil and gas show a clear market for the extraction and transport of fossil fuels (NACE codes 06.10, 49.50), and our evidence links major banks like HSBC and Santander to the financing of these activities. A potential cause of action in tort lies against these banks for negligently failing in their duty of vigilance to prevent the foreseeable harm caused by climate change. The public sector, including the Bank of England and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, could be subject to a judicial review claim for failing to use their powers to mitigate these systemic financial and environmental risks. The private companies jointly responsible are not just the banks, but also their major corporate clients in the fossil fuel sector, such as Shell and BP (ICB Supersector 6010, Oil, Gas and Coal). The harmed parties form a broad class, including the UK insurance industry (NACE 65.12, Non-life insurance), which faces escalating claims from extreme weather, and the agricultural sector (NACE Section A), which suffers from crop damage and land degradation. The probability of success for a direct legal claim is still developing but is a key area for strategic litigation, while the potential for a highly effective media and public pressure campaign is very high.
Finally, we can explore contractual and competition law violations where public bodies and private companies are intertwined. For example, if a government department awards a major IT services contract (NACE 62.09) to a large, established systems integrator with close ties to the banking sector, and it can be shown that this was the result of a flawed or uncompetitive procurement process influenced by the market power of the incumbent banks, this could be challenged. The contract could be deemed unlawful, and excluded competitors could have a claim for damages. This would directly involve a government department as a defendant, alongside the successful private bidder, such as a major IT consultancy or a bank’s own technology subsidiary. The victims would be the competing IT firms who were unfairly shut out of the process. While proving such a case is difficult, the potential for a public interest challenge highlighting cronyism or anti-competitive procurement has a strong chance of attracting media attention and regulatory investigation.
This report serves as a detailed addendum to our Letter Before Claim dated May 6, 2025, addressed to the Governor of the Bank of England. Following the Bank’s perfunctory response of May 20, 2025, which dismissed our initial substantive queries, this document elaborates on the grounds for our proposed legal action. It synthesizes extensive research, including the Bank’s own publications, parliamentary records, analyses of recent global financial events, and established competition law precedent to substantiate our profound concerns regarding the discharge of the Bank’s statutory duty to maintain financial stability.
Our objective is twofold: first, to articulate with greater precision the nature of the alleged systemic risks and regulatory omissions that we believe warrant judicial review; and second, to provide a more detailed basis for our requests for information, which are crucial for determining whether to proceed with litigation. We also outline potential remedies and non-litigious solutions, reinforcing our position that legal action is a last resort, but one we are fully prepared to take in the public interest.
B. Expanded Analysis of Systemic Risks and Alleged Regulatory Failings
Our investigation has identified several interconnected areas where the Bank of England’s (the “Bank”) approach to its financial stability mandate appears, prima facie, to be inadequate, giving rise to significant potential harm to consumers, businesses, and the UK economy as a whole.
1. Inadequate Management of Interest Rate and Liquidity Risk
The collapses of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse in 2023 were not unforeseeable anomalies but rather materialisations of known risks. SVB’s failure was a direct result of its significant holdings of long-duration bonds, whose value plummeted as interest rates rose, a risk not adequately reflected in its regulatory capital ratios. This interest rate risk was compounded by a concentrated, uninsured depositor base, leading to a digitally-facilitated bank run. The Bank of England’s own research, such as Staff Working Paper No. 1,111, explicitly acknowledges how such shocks can trigger a contraction in lending and impact market stability.
Despite these clear international precedents and internal expertise, it is unclear what specific, robust actions the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) or the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) have taken to reassess and mitigate these precise risks within the UK’s banking sector. General statements about the resilience of the UK system are insufficient. We allege that there is a potential failure to adequately supervise banks’ management of interest rate risk within their “held-to-maturity” portfolios and to properly stress-test for the kind of rapid, large-scale deposit outflows seen in the digital age. This potential inaction or inadequate action constitutes a failure to take account of relevant considerations and may be considered an irrational approach to the Bank’s stability objective, exposing investors and the public to unnecessary risk.
2. The Unjustified Delay of Basel 3.1 Implementation
The decision to delay the implementation of the final Basel 3.1 framework to January 2027 is a significant point of concern. While framed as a measure to maintain competitiveness with the US, this decision appears to prioritise commercial considerations over the Bank’s primary statutory objective of financial stability. The very purpose of the Basel 3.1 reforms is to enhance the resilience of the banking sector by improving the measurement and management of risk. Delaying these enhanced standards, particularly in the wake of the 2023 banking turmoil, is arguably an irrational decision.
Furthermore, as noted in Parliament, the changes within Basel 3.1, such as the removal of the SME support factor, have foreseeable negative consequences for lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. It is unclear what assessment the Bank has made of this impact on the real economy, a key financial stability consideration. By apparently prioritizing alignment with a delayed and uncertain US timetable over the clear stability benefits of the internationally-agreed framework, the Bank may have failed to properly balance relevant factors, a classic ground for judicial review. This regulatory forbearance not only risks systemic stability but also distorts competition, favouring incumbents over smaller, more agile competitors who rely on transparent and robust regulatory frameworks.
3. Failure to Address Negative Externalities and ESG-related Financial Risks
The Bank’s own research, including “Energy and climate policy in a DSGE model of the United Kingdom” (Staff Working Paper No. 1,064), acknowledges the significant macroeconomic impacts of climate-related events. Our analysis indicates that major UK-based banks, including HSBC, Barclays, and Santander, provide extensive financial services to companies operating in sectors with high negative externalities. These include firms involved in the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas (NACE Division 06), mining of coal and lignite (NACE Division 05), wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels (NACE 46.71), and transport via pipeline (NACE 49.50).
By providing project finance, corporate loans, and underwriting services to these sectors, the banks are allegedly failing to adequately price in the associated climate-related financial risks. This conduct potentially constitutes a breach of the banks’ duty of care to their investors and a failure to exercise the necessary “Duty of Vigilance” regarding foreseeable environmental and social harm. The financing of such activities creates significant negative externalities—the costs of climate adaptation, biodiversity loss, and public health impacts—that are borne by the public and other industries, not by the banks themselves. This creates a market distortion, where responsible firms are competitively disadvantaged, and generates a latent, unquantified systemic risk on the balance sheets of the UK’s largest financial institutions. The Bank’s failure to compel banks to internalise these costs or to adjust macroprudential tools to account for this systemic risk build-up represents a potential failure to consider a highly relevant factor in maintaining long-term financial stability.
4. Anti-Competitive Market Structure and Foreclosure
The UK banking sector, classified under NACE 64.19 (Other monetary intermediation) and ICB Supersector 3010 (Banks), is highly concentrated. This concentration creates inherent systemic risk and weakens competitive pressures. Competition law precedents, such as the European Commission’s analysis in the TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine case, demonstrate a clear methodology for identifying market power and its potential for abuse. We allege that the major banks may be abusing their collective dominant position.
A key area of concern is the market for clearing and settlement services and other activities auxiliary to financial services (NACE 66.19), which function as essential facilities for the financial industry. There is a risk that the incumbent banks are using their control over this infrastructure to foreclose or disadvantage innovative competitors in the Financial Technology (FinTech) sector. These FinTech companies, operating in sectors like IT services (NACE 62.09) and software publishing (NACE 58.29), are being denied fair and non-discriminatory access, stifling innovation and limiting consumer choice. This conduct could amount to an abuse of dominance under the Competition Act 1998. Furthermore, historic arrangements underpinning payment systems like APACS and CHAPS may fall foul of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 if they contain restrictive provisions that were not properly registered, rendering them potentially void and unenforceable. This systemic failure of competition harms both FinTech innovators and the end consumers who are denied the benefits of a more dynamic market.
C. Potential Constructive Solutions and Areas for Engagement
COCOO remains committed to finding a constructive path forward. In addition to our previous proposals, we suggest the Bank and other relevant authorities consider the following:
- A Thematic Review of Access to Essential Financial Infrastructure: The CMA, in conjunction with the FCA, should conduct a market study into the provision of clearing, settlement, and payment system access, focusing on whether the terms of access for FinTech and challenger banks are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
- Enhanced Due Diligence Standards for High-Risk Sectors: The PRA should issue formal guidance on the “Duty of Vigilance,” requiring banks to conduct and disclose enhanced due diligence for financing activities in sectors with high negative externalities, such as those identified by NACE codes 05 and 06.
- Accelerated Implementation of Basel 3.1 with SME Safeguards: The Treasury and PRA should reconsider the delay of Basel 3.1, while exploring specific, time-limited measures to mitigate any potential negative impact on SME lending, ensuring that stability is not sacrificed for perceived competitiveness.
- Transparency in Regulatory Decision-Making: The Bank of England and the FCA must commit to greater transparency in their decision-making processes, particularly when balancing competing objectives like financial stability, competition, and consumer protection. This should include publishing the reasoning behind significant policy choices and responses to substantive stakeholder concerns.
D. Improved Requests for Disclosure
Given the Bank’s initial refusal to engage, we now provide more specific requests for information, grounded in the legal and market analysis detailed above, to enable a full understanding of the Bank’s actions and omissions.
1. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request – Public Information
We formally request any publicly available reports, policy statements, or guidance issued by the Bank of England, PRA, or FCA since January 1, 2023, concerning:
- The application of competition law or principles of fair access to financial market infrastructures, including clearing and payment systems (NACE 66.19).
- The assessment of systemic risks arising from market concentration within the UK banking sector (NACE 64.19).
- The financial stability implications of financing activities in the fossil fuel extraction sectors (NACE Division 05 and 06).
- The rationale and impact assessments related to the decision to delay the UK implementation of Basel 3.1 standards.
- The criteria and effectiveness of the LINK scheme and the process for establishing shared banking hubs.
2. Pre-Action Disclosure (PAD) Request – Non-Public Information
Pursuant to CPR 31.16, and noting the public law duty of candour, we request the following specific documents, which are essential for the fair disposal of these proceedings and to assist in potential resolution:
- Re: Anti-Competitive Conduct: All internal policies, correspondence, and meeting minutes from the last five years relating to the Bank’s strategy for providing access to its clearing and settlement systems (or those it oversees) to third-party FinTech and payment service providers (operating under NACE codes 62.09, 63.10). This is directly relevant to assessing potential abuse of dominance and foreclosure (Grounds 1 and 2).
- Re: High-Risk Financing: All internal risk assessments, FPC submissions, and credit committee guidance documents from the last five years that concern the provision of finance to companies whose primary operations fall under NACE codes 05 (Mining of coal and lignite) and 06 (Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas). This is necessary to scrutinize the Bank’s adherence to its stability mandate and its management of foreseeable externality risks (Grounds 1, 2, and 4).
- Re: Basel 3.1 Delay: All internal reports, FPC/PRA board papers, and correspondence with HM Treasury that formed the basis for the Bank’s position on the decision to delay the implementation of the Basel 3.1 framework. This is critical for assessing the rationality and procedural propriety of a key regulatory decision (Grounds 1, 2, 3, and 4).
- Re: Dismissal of COCOO’s Correspondence: All internal communications, memoranda, and records of discussion relating to the assessment of and decision-making process for responding to our letter dated 22 April 2025. This is required to assess whether the dismissal of our concerns was procedurally fair and based on a rational consideration of the points raised (Grounds 2 and 3).